+ History & Danger of Administrative Law

October 7, 2014

by Philip Hamburger, Columbia Law School

PHILIP HAMBURGER is the Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. He received his B.A. from Princeton University and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He has also taught at the University of Chicago Law School, the George Washington University Law School, the University of Virginia Law School, and Northwestern Law School. A contributor to National Review Online, he has written for several law reviews and journals, including the American Journal of Legal History, the Supreme Court Review, the Notre Dame Law Review, and the Journal of Law and Politics. He is the author of Separation of Church and State, Law and Judicial Duty, and, most recently, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?

The following is adapted from a speech delivered on May 6, 2014, at Hillsdale College’s Allan P. Kirby, Jr. Center for Constitutional Studies and Citizenship in Washington, D.C., as part of the AWC Family Foundation Lecture Series.

Reprinted by permission from Imprimis, a publication of Hillsdale College.

fancy

There are many complaints about administrative law—including that it is arbitrary, that it is a burden on the economy, and that it is an intrusion on freedom. The question I will address here is whether administrative law is unlawful, and I will focus on constitutional history. Those who forget history, it is often said, are doomed to repeat it. And this is what has happened in the United States with the rise of administrative law—or, more accurately, administrative power.

Administrative law is commonly defended as a new sort of power, a product of the 19th and the 20th centuries that developed to deal with the problems of modern society in all its complexity. From this perspective, the Framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated it and the Constitution could not have barred it. What I will suggest, in contrast, is that administrative power is actually very old. It revives what used to be called prerogative or absolute power, and it is thus something that the Constitution centrally prohibited.

But first, what exactly do I mean by administrative law or administrative power? Put simply, administrative acts are binding or constraining edicts that come, not through law, but through other mechanisms or pathways. For example, when an executive agency issues a rule constraining Americans—barring an activity that results in pollution, for instance, or restricting how citizens can use their land—it is an attempt to exercise binding legislative power not through an act of Congress, but through an administrative edict. Similarly, when an executive agency adjudicates a violation of one of these edicts—in order to impose a fine or some other penalty—it is an attempt to exercise binding judicial power not through a judicial act, but again through an administrative act.

In a way we can think of administrative law as a form of off-road driving. The Constitution offers two avenues of binding power—acts of Congress and acts of the courts. Administrative acts by executive agencies are a way of driving off-road, exercising power through other pathways. For those in the driver’s seat, this can be quite exhilarating. For the rest of us, it’s a little unnerving.

The Constitution authorizes three types of power, as we all learned in school—the legislative power is located in Congress, executive power is located in the president and his subordinates, and the judicial power is located in the courts. How does administrative power fit into that arrangement?

The conventional answer to this question is based on the claim of the modernity of administrative law. Administrative law, this argument usually goes, began in 1887 when Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission, and it expanded decade by decade as Congress created more such agencies. A variant of this account suggests that administrative law is actually a little bit older—that it began to develop in the early practices of the federal government of the United States. But whether it began in the 1790s or in the 1880s, administrative law according to this account is a post-1789 development and—this is the key point—it arose as a pragmatic and necessary response to new and complex practical problems in American life. The pragmatic and necessitous character of this development is almost a mantra—and of course if looked at that way, opposition to administrative law is anti-modern and quixotic.

But there are problems with this conventional history of administrative law. Rather than being a modern, post-constitutional American development, I argue that the rise of administrative law is essentially a re-emergence of the absolute power practiced by pre-modern kings. Rather than a modern necessity, it is a latter-day version of a recurring threat—a threat inherent in human nature and in the temptations of power.

The Prerogative Power of Kings

The constitutional history of the past thousand years in common law countries records the repeated ebb and flow of absolutism on the one side and law on the other. English kings were widely expected to rule through law. They had Parliament for making law and courts of law for adjudicating cases, and they were expected to govern through the acts of these bodies. But kings were discontent with governing through the law and often acted on their own. The personal power that kings exercised when evading the law was called prerogative power.

Whereas ordinarily kings bound their subjects through statutes passed by Parliament, when exercising prerogative power they bound subjects through proclamations or decrees—or what we today call rules or regulations. Whereas ordinarily kings would repeal old statutes by obtaining new statutes, when exercising prerogative power they issued dispensations and suspensions—or what we today call waivers. Whereas ordinarily kings enforced the law through the courts of law, when exercising prerogative power they enforced their commands through their prerogative courts—courts such as the King’s Council, the Star Chamber, and the High Commission—or what we today call administrative courts. Ordinarily, English judges resolved legal disputes in accordance with their independent judgment regarding the law. But when kings exercised prerogative power, they expected deference from judges, both to their own decrees and to the holdings and interpretations of their extra-legal prerogative courts.

Although England did not have a full separation of powers of the sort written into the American Constitution, it did have a basic division of powers. Parliament had the power to make laws, the law courts had the power to adjudicate, and the king had the power to exercise force. But when kings acted through prerogative power, they or their prerogative courts exercised all government powers, overriding these divisions. For example, the Star Chamber could make regulations, as well as prosecute and adjudicate infractions. And defenders of this sort of prerogative power were not squeamish about describing it as absolute power. Absolutism was their justification.

Conceptually, there were three central elements of this absolutism: extra-legal power, supra-legal power, and the consolidation of power. It was extra-legal or outside the law in the sense that it bound the public not through laws or statutes, but through other means. It was supra-legal or above the law in the sense that kings expected judges to defer to it—notwithstanding their duty to exercise their own independent judgment. And it was consolidated in the sense that it united all government powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—in the king or in his prerogative courts. And underlying these three central elements was the usual conceptual justification for absolute power: necessity. Necessity, it was said, was not bound by law.

These claims on behalf of absolutism, of course, did not go unchallenged. When King John called Englishmen to account extralegally in his Council, England’s barons demanded in Magna Carta in 1215 that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or even summoned except through the mechanisms of law. When 14th century English kings questioned men in the king’s Council, Parliament in 1354 and 1368 enacted due process statutes. When King James I attempted to make law through proclamations, judges responded in 1610 with an opinion that royal proclamations were unlawful and void. When James subsequently demanded judicial deference to prerogative interpretations of statutes, the judges refused. Indeed, in 1641 Parliament abolished the Star Chamber and the High Commission, the bodies then engaging in extra-legal lawmaking and adjudication. And most profoundly, English constitutional law began to develop—and it made clear that there could be no extra-legal, supra-legal, or consolidated power.

The Rise of Absolutism in America

The United States Constitution echoes this. Early Americans were very familiar with absolute power. They feared this extra-legal, supra-legal, and consolidated power because they knew from English history that such power could evade the law and override all legal rights. It is no surprise, then, that the United States Constitution was framed to bar this sort of power. To be precise, Americans established the Constitution to be the source of all government power and to bar any absolute power. Nonetheless, absolute power has come back to life in common law nations, including America.

After absolute power was defeated in England and America, it circled back from the continent through Germany, and especially through Prussia. There, what once had been the personal prerogative power of kings became the bureaucratic administrative power of the states. The Prussians were the leaders of this development in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the 19th century they became the primary theorists of administrative power, and many of them celebrated its evasion of constitutional law and constitutional rights.

This German theory would become the intellectual source of American administrative law. Thousands upon thousands of Americans studied administrative power in Germany, and what they learned there about administrative power became standard fare in American universities. At the same time, in the political sphere, American Progressives were becoming increasingly discontent with elected legislatures, and they increasingly embraced German theories of administration and defended the imposition of administrative law in America in terms of pragmatism and necessity.

The Progressives, moreover, understood what they were doing. For example, in 1927, a leading Progressive theorist openly said that the question of whether an American administrative officer could issue regulations was similar to the question of whether pre-modern English kings could issue binding proclamations. By the 1920s, however, Progressives increasingly were silent about the continuity between absolute power and modern administrative power, as this undermined their claims about its modernity and lawfulness.

In this way, over the past 120 years, Americans have reestablished the very sort of power that the Constitution most centrally forbade. Administrative law is extra-legal in that it binds Americans not through law but through other mechanisms—not through statutes but through regulations—and not through the decisions of courts but through other adjudications. It is supra-legal in that it requires judges to put aside their independent judgment and defer to administrative power as if it were above the law—which our judges do far more systematically than even the worst of 17th century English judges. And it is consolidated in that it combines the three powers of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—in administrative agencies.

Let me close by addressing just two of many constitutional problems illuminated by the re-emergence of absolutism in the form of administrative power: delegation and procedural rights.

One standard defense of administrative power is that Congress uses statutes to delegate its lawmaking power to administrative agencies. But this is a poor defense. The delegation of lawmaking has long been a familiar feature of absolute power. When kings exercised extra-legal power, they usually had at least some delegated authority from Parliament. Henry VIII, for example, issued binding proclamations under an authorizing statute called the Act of Proclamations. His binding proclamations were nonetheless understood to be exercises of absolute power. And in the 18th century the Act of Proclamations was condemned as unconstitutional.

Against this background, the United States Constitution expressly bars the delegation of legislative power. This may sound odd, given that the opposite is so commonly asserted by scholars and so routinely accepted by the courts. But read the Constitution. The Constitution’s very first substantive words are, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” The word “all” was not placed there by accident. The Framers understood that delegation had been a problem in English constitutional history, and the word “all” was placed there precisely to bar it.

As for procedural rights, the history is even more illuminating. Administrative adjudication evades almost all of the procedural rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It subjects Americans to adjudication without real judges, without juries, without grand juries, without full protection against self-incrimination, and so forth. Like the old prerogative courts, administrative courts substitute inquisitorial process for the due process of law—and that’s not just an abstract accusation; much early administrative procedure appears to have been modelled on civilian-derived inquisitorial process. Administrative adjudication thus becomes an open avenue for evasion of the Bill of Rights.

The standard justification for the administrative evasion of procedural rights is that they apply centrally to the regular courts, but not entirely to administrative adjudication. But the history shows that procedural rights developed primarily to bar prerogative or administrative proceedings, not to regulate what the government does in regular courts of law. As I already mentioned, the principle of due process developed as early as the 14th century, when Parliament used it to prevent the exercise of extra-legal power by the King’s Council. It then became a constitutional principle in the 17th century in opposition to the prerogative courts. Similarly, jury rights developed partly in opposition to administrative proceedings, and thus some of the earliest constitutional cases in America held administrative proceedings unconstitutional for depriving defendants of a jury trial.

* * *

In sum, the conventional understanding of administrative law is utterly mistaken. It is wrong on the history and oblivious to the danger. That danger is absolutism: extra-legal, supra-legal, and consolidated power. And the danger matters because administrative power revives this absolutism. The Constitution carefully barred this threat, but constitutional doctrine has since legitimized this dangerous sort of power. It therefore is necessary to go back to basics. Among other things, we should no longer settle for some vague notion of “rule of law,” understood as something that allows the delegation of legislative and judicial powers to administrative agencies. We should demand rule through law and rule under law. Even more fundamentally, we need to reclaim the vocabulary of law: Rather than speak of administrative law, we should speak of administrative power—indeed, of absolute power or more concretely of extra-legal, supra-legal, and consolidated power. Then we at least can begin to recognize the danger.



+ Legislatively Overturn Roe v Wade

March 22, 2014

Folks:

It is possible to overturn Roe v Wade by Congressional Legislation. We do not have wait until the Supreme Court, who created the “right” to abortion out of thin air in violation of their Constitutional mandate, to correct their arrogance. We can overturn Roe v Wade by legislation.

Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) has introduced and co-sponsored the Life at Conception Act in the Senate (S.583), along with 21 others. In the House Rep Jim Jordan (R-OH) introduced the Life at Conception Act, (H.R.1091) with 124 others.

Life at Conception Act – Declares that the right to life guaranteed by the Constitution is vested in each human being beginning at the moment of fertilization, cloning, or other moment at which an individual comes into being. Prohibits construing this Act to authorize the prosecution of any woman for the death of her unborn child.

This Act establishes what medicine and science has established long ago, that life begins at conception. Establishing this scientific fact into law will overturn Roe v Wade.

Senator Rand Paul explains:

Sign the Petition: National ProLife Alliance



+ Pope: Prisons shouldn’t just be about punishment

November 23, 2012



+ Statistics

August 4, 2012

Created by: OnlineCriminalJusticeDegree.com

(more…)



+ West Virginia Judge, William Watkins goes Berserk

July 3, 2012

West Virginia Judge, William Watkins goes Berserk, berates and threatens (with abuse of power) Rev. Arthur D. Hage in a divorce hearing. In listening to the video recording of the hearing, it is perfectly clear in our mind that Judge Watkins should be removed from the bench because of ?his anger issues and utterly?unprofessional?behavior that goes way beyond the pale.

No matter what Rev. Hage has done, and as best as we can tell he merely expressed his First Amendment rights and talked to a reporter, Judge Watkins behavior disqualifies him, in our opinion, as an officer of justice.

One source of the Judge’s anger is sourced in the Newspaper publishing a picture of his house, causing the Judge and his family to come under duress from some members of the public terrorizing his family. We completely understand that anger. However, Rev. Hage does not control the press. Even if Rev. Hage did control the press, the over-the-top anger of Judge Watkins, which is?understandable?if his family was under attack, the proper and judicial response for the judge would be to recuse himself, instead of humiliating himself in the way be behaved.

After this hearing, Rev. Hage filed an ethics violation against the Judge, as was proper to do. Only after the ethics complaint did Judge Watkins?recused himself from the case. This is something a professional would have done from the very beginning.

Our concern, however, is not exclusive to this one judge, but to the growing lack of judicial decorum witness in many cases like this one. Justice cannot be served by Judges like this one, and more critically, outright miscarriage of justice is likely.

Read more about it >>>>

?



+ Kansas Courts Collude to Protect Planned Parenthood

June 11, 2012

The evil of Planned Parenthood knows no bounds. As such, the devil takes extraordinary means to protect his project of killing innocents through Planned Parenthood, the organization began by Margaret Sanger for the purpose of eugenics to eliminate “unfit” people such as the ill, infirmed. poor, insane, and blacks.

In this case the “Kansas Supreme Court colluded with prosecutors and the Kathleen Sebelius administration to halt his [Attorney General??Phill Kline]?investigation and turn the media against him, culminating in an effort to end his legal career.”

This is another of many examples of the typical Progressive strategy to abuse power to crush those who oppose them.

Anatomy of a lie: Kansas court?s scheme
to eliminate Planned Parenthood prosecutor revealed

by Kathleen Gilbert

?OPEKA, Kansas, June 7, 2012 (LifeSiteNews.com) – The man who became the first prosecutor in America to take on Planned Parenthood in court has revealed new details in the astonishing story of how the Kansas Supreme Court colluded with prosecutors and the Kathleen Sebelius administration to halt his investigation and turn the media against him, culminating in an effort to end his legal career.

For those unfamiliar with the Phill Kline case, the?recusal motion?filed last month by lawyers for the former Kansas Attorney General deftly encapsulates how the investigator was vilified for allegedly violating ?patient privacy? in the normal course of investigating child rape, which in turn brought him head to head with Planned Parenthood.?

The motion tells the story Kline?summed up recently?as ?Alice through the looking glass: It only gets curiouser and curiouser.?

Although Kline?s motion focused on the need for two of the state Supreme Court?s justices to recuse themselves, in a testimony to the strength of his argument, all five Supreme Court justices named for their involvement in the case recused themselves last month – an exodus unprecedented in recent memory, as a Court spokesman?acknowledged.

One of the motion?s early footnotes notes that the reason for the twisted tale was predictable: it involved abortion.?

?It is difficult to fathom any other context where criminal targets could so effectively use the courts to prevent a prosecutor from using lawful means to gather evidence of their crimes,? said Kline?s lawyers. ?However, in the context of abortion it should surprise no one.? The lawyers quoted U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia?s observation that, ?the jurisprudence of this Court has a way of changing when abortion is involved.?

From the beginning, AG Kline?s investigation into child rape was repeatedly hampered by abortionists? extraordinary legal motions: in one example, the court handed over the task of redacting the records in question to the target of the investigation itself, Planned Parenthood – a move Kline called ?unprecedented,? and which resulted in over-redaction.

As soon as Kline moved out of the attorney general?s office in 2007, Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri teamed with Kansas? new top attorney in a desperate bid to recover the abortion records Kline still held.

Kline?s pro-abortion successor, AG Steve Morrison, first attempted to run ?an intelligence raid for Planned Parenthood? in the spring of 2007 by demanding Kline?s records – even though Morrison already owned copies of all of them, and had no intention of prosecuting anyway – but the motion was denied. Two months later, Planned Parenthood began trying to force Kline to hand over the records. Meanwhile Morrison, who publicly cleared Planned Parenthood of charges, subpoenaed a local magistrate for his copy of the records.

When that failed, Planned Parenthood officials arrived unannounced three days later in the same judge?s office to demand the records. The judge, Richard Anderson, said the records likely contained evidence of their criminal activity, and refused.

Finally, Morrison joined forces with Planned Parenthood itself in their Supreme Court action against Kline, a bid that failed in December 2008.

But Supreme Court Justice Carol Beier?s opinion in that ruling, widely noted for its surprisingly abusive language against Kline, had a falsehood buried within that few noticed at the time: she wrote that Kline left ?no coherent copies? of the records at the AG?s office, a claim Kline?s lawyers called a ?whopper.? The ?spectacular falsehood? was the basis of Beier?s faux ?sanction? ordering Kline to return totally redundant record copies, putting him in a bad light.

Even worse, previous writings by Beier strongly hinted that the red herring was intentional: Beier had endorsed the idea that ?[t]he media are tools to produce cultural infrastructure.?

The ruse worked: ?Kline abortion prosecution faulted, Justices order medical records turned over to state,? reported the?Topeka Capital-Journal; the?Kansas City Star blared, ?High court sanctions Kline for handling of abortion records.?

Ultimately, many of the 107 charges Kline had brought against Planned Parenthood, including all 23 felonies, were thrown out last year when it was discovered that the Kathleen Sebelius administration had destroyed key documents needed to compare Kline?s records with Planned Parenthood?s later submissions. The destruction took place in 2005, two years after Kline began uncovering abortionists? alleged criminal activity.

Fortunately, Kline?s recent recusal motion has had an impact: four days after the filing, the five justices, including Sebelius-appointed Carol Beier, said they would recuse themselves based on a technicality regarding their previous involvement with Kline – something they would have known about for years – reasoning Kline?s attorney called a smokescreen to divert attention from the embarrassing motion.

Even so, said the attorney, the layers of deception demonstrated in the case have rendered it ?irretrievably flawed.? Meanwhile, as Kline fights the ethics allegations aimed at suspending his license, in proceedings that have also?proved deeply flawed thus far, his legal expenses have topped $300,000 and counting.

Although the recusal motion focused on Justice Beier?s role in the affair, its contents reveal just how far Kansas officials were willing to go to protect Planned Parenthood from prosecution.

Not only were AG Morrison?s actions baseless other than to erase record of abortionsts? wrongdoing, said Kline?s lawyers, but the Beier sanction raised the stakes even more by requiring Kline to hand over records that Kansas officials never had to begin with – ones he procured in his own subsequent abortion investigations as a district attorney.

As a result, private documents and statements Kline had assured sources would be kept private, were handed over to Kansas – and abortionists.

?I?ve been told,? said Kline, ?that all of that information was then turned over to the attorneys for the abortion clinics.?

Click?here?for more information on contributing to Phill Kline?s legal fund.



+ Christian Freed from Slave-like Conditions

February 25, 2012

NCJP frees Christian man held
in slave-like conditions by rich Muslim

by Shafique Khokhar

NCJP activists successfully obtain the release of Qamar Masih, 25, father of two, who was abducted over an unpaid debt by a landowner for whom he used to work in “slave-like conditions”. A priest in Faisalabad is happy about the outcome, blames such incidents on the country’s “feudal system”.

?

Faisalabad (AsiaNews) February 24, 2012 ??A rich Muslim landowner abducted a Christian man in Faisalabad for failure to repay a debt he had contracted and not repaid whilst working for him. Sources close to the Christian man’s family said the latter left the job tired of being exploited and abused for a pittance. Only the intervention of the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) of the Catholic Church of Pakistan led to the man’s release and a peaceful resolution of the issue. However, the case highlights the fact that Pakistan’s “feudal system” forces “poor workers into slave-like conditions”.

Today, Qamar Masih, also known as Bhola 35, a Christian father two from Malkhanwala ?in Faisalabad, is back at work at a cattle feed shop owned by a Muslim where he earns 7,500 rupees (US$ 88) a month, a salary that allows him to make a decent living for himself and his family.

However, just this Wednesday, his former employer, Bilal Sarwar Cheema, a rich landowner connected with Punjab’s land mafia, had him abducted by a group of armed men. He was kidnapped because he had not repaid a loan (20,000 rupees) the rich Muslim landowner had granted to him last year.

In order to secure her husband’s release, Qamar’s 32-year-old wife, Uzma Dildar, called on Fr Khalid Rasheed Asi and the activists of the Faisalabad branch of the NCJP for help. She told them that her husband had quit his job because of constant harassment and abuses from his employer who treated him like a serf.

The NCJP went to the police, which opened an investigation. When they met the rich Muslim landowner, Bilal Sarwar Cheema confirmed the abduction. He told police that when he found out that Qamar had returned home after an absence of seven months, he decided to abduct him.

Mediation allowed the Christian man to go free on condition he repay the loan in instalments over a certain period so that he had enough money to support his wife and daughters.

Contacted by?AsiaNews, Fr Khalid Rasheed Asi explained, “Pakistan’s remotest regions are still under a feudal system”. It is common practice “for rich landowners to grant loans” and “then keep workers in slave-like conditions for generations” doing “nothing but the same job”.

“I’m happy,” the clergyman said, “that for once the matter was sorted out peacefully.”



U.S. Government Seeks Yet Another Power Grab

January 18, 2012

?CALL TO ACTION

The video below discusses the Senate version of the House’s Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). In the Senate the bill is called the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA). SOPA has gotten more attention than PIPA because it was moving faster in the legislative process. But PIPA is just as dangerous, and now it is moving faster.

PIPA would give the government new powers to block Americans’ access websites that corporations don’t like. The bill lets corporations and the US government censor entire websites and cut sites off from advertising, payments and donations.

This legislation will stifle free speech and innovation, and even threaten popular web services like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook.

The bill is scheduled for a test vote in the Senate on Jan. 24th: We need to act now to let our lawmakers know just how terrible it is. Will you fill out the form above to ask your lawmakers to oppose the legislation and support a filibuster?

This is a “sweet deal” for the Entertainment Industry. The industry will no longer have to deal with the complications of laws already on the books to protect their intellectual property. ?Instead, these bills give more power to the government. As we all know, history has proven that government cannot be trusted with power. This is why our Founding Fathers, in their great wisdom, constructed a Constitution to limit government power and to protect citizens from the rights that only God can grant (see the Declaration of Independence, which progressives also ignore).

“>PROTECT IP / SOPA Breaks The Internet from hefuture”>Center For Rights on Vimeo.

Here is a cute song about this issue:

?

Articles on issue:

To help in understanding the bills before Congress and why they are so dangerous, click here.

?Contact your Congressman and Senators to express your views on this critical issue:

Contact My?Representative

Contact My Senators

?

It is YOUR Internet



Benedict XVI visits prison in Rome

December 19, 2011

Our Holy Father calls all people of good will to encourage and assist governments and corrections departments to treat prisoners with respect and dignity that is due to all human beings. He said, “?Prisoners are human beings who deserve, despite their crime, to be treated with respect and dignity. They need our attention.?

?



Christian Bale roughed up trying to visit China pro-life activist

December 16, 2011

 

DONGSHIGU VILLAGE, China, December 16, 2011 (LifeSiteNews.com) – Famed?Batman?star Christian Bale is making headlines after he traveled nine hours from Beijing to visit blind forced abortion opponent Chen Guangcheng.?

The actor never got the chance, however, as he was roughed up and forced away from Chen?s village by Chinese government officials, according to a CNN?report.

?What I really wanted to do was shake the man?s hand and say ?thank you,? and tell him what an inspiration he is,? he said.

Bale was in Beijing for the premiere of ?The Flowers of War,? a drama about the 1937 Rape of Nanjing. About his attempt to visit Chen, Bale stated, ?I?m not brave doing this . . . This was just a situation ? I can?t look the other way.?

According to Reggie Littlejohn, president of Women?s Rights Without Frontiers, ?Christian Bale is a hero.? He is starring in the most expensive film ever made in China, which China hopes will win an Academy Award.? Nevertheless, he has the courage to stand against official injustice and has greatly raised the visibility of Chen?s case.?

Littlejohn contrasted Bale?s actions with those of Relativity Media.? ?Christian Bale has used his star power to shine a light on the unjust treatment of Chen Guangcheng,? she said.? ?In contrast, Relativity Media filmed ?21 and Over? in Linyi, where Chen is languishing under house arrest.? They did nothing to help Chen.? I hope that moviegoers will demonstrate their concern for Chen Guangcheng at the box office.? We encourage people to see ?The Flowers of War? and boycott ?21 and Over.??

Christian Bale is not the only one who has focused attention on Chen Guangcheng.? Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke have both recently spoken on his behalf.? ?We urge Ambassador Locke to visit Chen Guangcheng,? stated Littlejohn.

The flow of Chinese citizens to visit Chen despite the risk of beatings and detention, and the Chinese and international ?Sunglasses? campaigns, have raised the visibility of Chen?s case as well.? These campaigns can be found?here?and?here.

Chen Guangcheng exposed the systematic use of forced abortion and sterilization in Linyi City in 2005.? For four years, three months, he was jailed, tortured and denied medical treatment.? Since his release he has languished under strict house arrest.?


Sign a petition to free Chen?here.